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Abstract. Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty (a patient has condition C), and the evidence 
E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors (diagnostic tests) have voted for H and a minority of  
k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the 
probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror’s competence and on the absolute margin 
between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor on the proportion h/n. This 
paper reassesses that result and explores its implications. First, using the classical Condorcet jury model, I 
derive a more general version of Condorcet’s formula, confirming the significance of the absolute margin, 
but showing that the probability that H is true given E depends also on an additional parameter: the prior 
probability that H is true. Second, I show that a related result holds when we consider not the degree of 
belief we attach to H given E, but the degree of support E gives to H. Third, I address the implications for 
the definition of special majority voting, a procedure used to capture the asymmetry between false positive 
and false negative decisions. I argue that the standard definition of special majority voting in terms of a 
required proportion of the jury is epistemically questionable, and that the classical Condorcet jury model 
leads to an alternative definition in terms of a required absolute margin between the majority and the 
minority. Finally, I show that the results on the significance of the absolute margin can be resisted if the so-
called assumption of symmetrical juror competence is relaxed. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Suppose there are two states of the world: x = 1 (e.g. the defendant is guilty), and x = 0 
(e.g. the defendant is innocent). An n-member jury has to make a decision on whether or 
not to convict the defendant. The jury’s aim is to ‘track the truth’, i.e. to find that the 
defendant is guilty if and only if the defendant is guilty. Given the state of the world x, 
each juror has the same probability (competence) p > ½ of voting for x. The value of p is 
the same for x = 1 and x = 0. Further, the votes of different jurors are independent from 
each other, conditional on the state of the world. This is the classical Condorcet jury 
model (see, amongst many others, Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983).  
 
Although the model is usually interpreted in terms of jury decisions, it also applies to 
other situations. It applies whenever the aim is to ‘track’ the true state of the world on the 
basis of multiple independent identically distributed signals, where each signal is not 
perfectly reliable but biased towards the truth. For example, suppose a doctor has to 
determine whether or not a patient has a particular condition C. There are two states of 
the world: x = 1 (the patient has condition C), and x = 0 (the patient does not have 
condition C). The doctor performs a sequence of diagnostic tests, where the different tests 
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(possibly repetitions of the same test) are independent from each other, but all have the 
same probability p > ½ of producing verdict x, given the state of the world x.2 
 
Consider two situations: 
 
Situation A. In a 12-member jury (a sequence of 12 tests), 12 jurors (tests) vote for 
‘guilty’ (‘condition C’) and 0 jurors (tests) vote for ‘innocent’ (‘no condition C’). 
 
Situation B. In a 1000-member jury (a sequence of 1000 tests), 507 jurors (tests) vote for 
‘guilty’ (‘condition C’) and 493 jurors (tests) vote for ‘innocent’ (‘no condition C’). 
 
In both situations p is the same, and we attach the same prior probability r to the 
proposition that the defendant is guilty (the patient has condition C) (where 0 < r < 1). In 
which of the two situations is the given majority verdict more likely to be correct? More 
precisely, which of the following two probabilities is the greater one: 
 
(i) the probability that the defendant is guilty (the patient has condition C), given that 
we have situation A, or 
(ii) the probability that the defendant is guilty (the patient has condition C), given that 
we have situation B? 
 
In situation A there is a 100% majority for ‘guilty’ (or ‘condition C’) (12 out of 12 
jurors), whereas in situation B there is only a 50.7% majority for ‘guilty’ (or ‘condition 
C’) (507 out of 1000 jurors). This might lead us to think that probability (i) is greater than 
probability (ii).  
 
However, according to a formula by Condorcet, if a majority of h jurors have voted for x 
and a minority of k jurors against x, the probability that the verdict of the majority is 
correct, i.e. that x is the true state of the world, is 
 
          ph-k  . 
 ph-k + (1-p)h-k 
 
Condorcet's formula has a striking implication, as summarized by McLean and Hewitt 
(1994, p. 37): 
 
"... the probability of [a correct majority judgment] can be improved by 
increasing h-k. Note h minus k, not h+k nor (h-k)/(h+k). What matters is the 
absolute size of the majority, not the size of the electorate, nor the proportion 
of the majority size to electorate size. If the jury theorem is applicable, we 
should talk about 'a majority of 8', 'a majority of 20', etc., not 'a two-thirds 
majority' or 'a three-quarters majority'. Condorcet did so in most of his later 
work." 
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In the example of situations A and B above, since the absolute margin between the 
majority and the minority in situation B (503-493=14) is greater than the one in situation 
A (12-0=12), it follows that probability (ii) is greater than probability (i).  
 
This paper reassesses this result and explores its implications. Let me summarize my 
argument. First, I derive a more general version of Condorcet's formula, by applying 
Bayes's theorem to the classical jury model. I show that Condorcet's formula is a 
simplification which leaves out an important complication. According to Condorcet’s 
formula, the probability that the verdict of the majority (for x) is correct, given the size of 
the majority, is a function of two parameters: the absolute margin between the majority 
and the minority (h-k), and the competence of each juror (p). I show that it is in fact a 
function of three parameters, the third parameter being the prior probability (r) that x is 
the true state of the world.  
 
Second, I show that the more general formula still confirms Condorcet’s basic insight. If 
we fix the prior probability r, the posterior probability that x is the true state of the world 
given the size of the majority depends only on the absolute margin between the majority 
and the minority (h-k) and is an increasing function of that margin.3 The posterior 
probability that x is the true state of world is invariant under changes of h and k (and 
consequently of h/n) that leave h-k fixed. I show that a similar result holds when we 
consider not the degree of belief we attach to the hypothesis that x is the true state of the 
world, given the evidence that a majority of h out of n jurors have voted for x, but the 
degree of support the evidence gives to the hypothesis.  
 
Third, I argue that the result has an implication for how special majority voting should be 
defined from the classical Condorcet jury perspective. In many jury decisions, special 
majorities of at least 10 out of 12 jurors are required for a ‘guilty’ verdict. Special 
majority voting is usually defined in terms of the proportion of the jury required for a 
positive decision (e.g. conviction). Suppose we use special majority voting for 
‘epistemic’ reasons, i.e. because of a concern for tracking a true state of the world.4 Then 
the standard definition of special majority voting not only has the wrong focus, but may 
be even counterproductive, given the assumptions of the classical Condorcet jury model. 
Alternatively, special majority voting can be defined in terms of the absolute margin 
between the majority and the minority required for a positive decision. I show that this 
alternative definition is ‘epistemically’ sound, and that it should thus be recommended 
from the perspective of the classical Condorcet jury model. It follows that, if we 
nonetheless want to defend special majority voting under the standard definition, we must 
either defend it for reasons other than ‘epistemic’ ones or reject the classical Condorcet 
jury model and find an alternative model that avoids the present results on the 
significance of the absolute margin. 
 
Finally, I show that such an alternative model can be obtained by relaxing the assumption 
of symmetrical competence. Specifically, suppose each juror's probability of voting for 
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'guilty' given guilt (p1) differs from the probability of voting for 'not guilty' given 
innocence (p0). Then it is no longer true that the probability that the defendant is guilty 
given the size of the majority for 'guilty' depends only on the absolute margin between 
the majority and the minority (h-k).5 For any fixed absolute margin h-k, that probability is 
now a monotonic function of the total number of jurors n. If p1 < p0, it is an increasing 
function, which converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. If p0 < p1, it is a decreasing function, 
which converges to 0 as n tends to infinity. 
 
2. The classical Condorcet jury model and the Condorcet jury theorem  
 
We use the labels 1, 2, …, n to denote the n jurors. We represent the state of the world by 
a binary variable X which takes the value 1 for ‘guilty’ and 0 for ‘not guilty’. We 
represent the votes of the jurors by the binary random variables V1, V2, …, Vn, where each 
Vi takes the value 1 for a ‘guilty’ vote and 0 for a ‘not guilty’ vote. The vote of juror i is 
correct if and only if the value of Vi coincides with the value of X. Capital letters are used 
to denote random variables and small letters to denote particular values. The classical 
Condorcet jury model assumes: 
 
Competence. For all jurors i = 1, 2, …, n, p1:=P(Vi=1|X=1)>½ and p0:=P(Vi=0|X=0)>½. 
 
Symmetrical competence. We have p1=p0=:p. 
 
Independence. For each x∈{0, 1}, V1, V2, …, Vn are independent from each other, given 
the state of the world x. 
 
The model’s most famous implication is the Condorcet jury theorem. Given the state of 
the world x, the probability that a majority of jurors will vote for x is greater than the 
probability that a majority will vote against x, and the first of these two probabilities 
converges to 1 as the number of jurors tends to infinity.6 In the medical example, the 
Condorcet jury theorem can be interpreted as follows. Given the state of the world x, the 
probability that a majority of tests will produce verdict x is greater than the probability 
that a majority of tests will produce the opposite verdict, and the first of these two 
probabilities converges to 1 as the number of tests tends to infinity.7 
 
Let us state the Condorcet jury theorem more formally. For each x∈{0, 1}, let Nx := 
|{i∈{1, 2, …, n} : Vi = x}|. Then Nx is the random variable whose value is the number of 
jurors voting for x (where x is 0 or 1). Here Nx > n/2 means that there is a simple majority 
for x. Since Nx is binomially distributed (with parameters n and p), we have: 
                                                          
5 Holding the competence parameters p0 and p1 and the prior probability r fixed. 
6 In the same model, if p < 1/2, the probability that a majority of jurors will vote for x, given the state of the 
world x, converges to 0 as the number of jurors tends to infinity. 
7 The result is robust to certain relaxations of the assumptions. A version of it still holds in certain cases 
where different jurors have different competence levels, but where the average competence is greater than 
½ (e.g. Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983; Borland 1989), and in cases where there are certain dependencies 
between different jurors’ votes (ibid.; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1994; but see Dietrich and List 2002). See also 
Hawthorne (2001). We see below that the Condorcet jury theorem itself does not require the assumption of 
symmetrical competence, whereas Condorcet’s formula on the significance of the absolute margin does. 
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Lemma 1. 
         n 
(a)  For each h = 0, 1, 2, …, n, P(Nx = h|X=x) = (    ) ph(1-p)n-h;  
           h 
 
                       n 
(b) P(Nx > n/2|X=x) = ∑  (    ) ph(1-p)n-h. 
       h>n/2    h 
 
Theorem 1. (Condorcet jury theorem) For each x∈{0, 1}, P(Nx > n/2|X=x) converges to 
1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
Thus the Condorcet jury theorem concerns  
 
(iii) the probability that x is the verdict of a majority of jurors, given that the state of 
the world is x. 
 
Determining this probability is useful for assessing the epistemic properties of majority 
voting from a ‘global’ perspective. A decision procedure (such as simple majority voting) 
tracks the truth if the following two subjunctive conditionals are true:  
 
• If x = 1 were the true state of the world, then x = 1 would be chosen. 
• If x = 0 were the true state of the world, then x = 0 would be chosen.8 
 
For any given values of n and p, the Condorcet jury framework allows us to determine 
the probability that x=1 is chosen under simple majority voting, given that x=1 is the true 
state of the world, and the probability that x=0 is chosen, given that x=0 is the true state 
of the world. If both probabilities are close to 1, then this suggests that simple majority 
voting performs well at ‘tracking the truth’. Motivated by this consideration, we say that 
a decision procedure tracks the truth in the limit if it satisfies the following condition: 
 
Truth-tracking in the limit (T).  
• P(1 is chosen|X=1) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity, and 
• P(0 is chosen|X=0) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
By the Condorcet jury theorem, for each x∈{0, 1}, the probability that x is chosen under 
simple majority voting, given that x is the true state of the world, converges to 1 as n 
tends to infinity. Simple majority voting thus satisfies condition (T), given the 
assumptions of the classical Condorcet jury framework. 
 
Although probability (iii) is useful for assessing the epistemic properties of majority 
voting from a ‘global’ perspective, it is only of limited use for the epistemic problem we 
are faced with ‘locally’, for instance when we put ourselves into the perspective of a 
court or doctor or when we compare situations A and B above. Probability (iii) is 
conditional on the state of the world, and that state of the world is precisely the 
unobserved parameter we typically want to estimate. What we can observe is whether a 
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tracking. See Nozick (1981).  
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majority of jurors have voted for or against x (and how large that majority is). So what we 
are interested in from a ‘local’ perspective is not probability (iii) but the converse 
conditional probability, namely 
 
(iv) the probability that the state of the world is x, given that x is the verdict of a 
majority of jurors. 
 
The hypothesis that we want to test is that the state of the world is x, and the evidence is 
that a majority of jurors (or, specifically, h out of n jurors) have voted for x. In this 
language, (iii) is the probability of the evidence given that the hypothesis is true, whereas 
(iv) is the probability that the hypothesis is true given the evidence. Probabilities (i) and 
(ii) in section 1 are both instances of (iv), not of (iii). 
 
3. The significance of the absolute margin for the degree of belief we attach to the 
hypothesis given the evidence 
 
Our hypothesis H is that X=x. We attach the prior probability r:=P(X=x) to the truth of H, 
where 0 < r < 1. In the case of a jury decision, r might be the (typically low) probability 
that a randomly chosen member of the population is guilty of the relevant charge. We 
need to specify what evidence we use to test H. The posterior probability of H given the 
evidence depends on the informational content of the evidence. We might use evidence of 
the following kinds: 
 
E   :  A majority of precisely h out of n jurors have voted for x, i.e. Nx = h, where  
 h > n/2. 
E* :  A majority of jurors have voted for x, i.e. Nx > n/2. 
 
Equations (a) and (b) in lemma 1 above give us P(E|H) and P(E*|H), respectively. Let 
¬H denote the negation of the hypothesis. By Bayes’s theorem, we have 
 
       P(H) P(E|H)                      P(H) P(E|H) 
P(H|E) =  =  , 
   P(E)          P(H) P(E|H) + P(¬H) P(E|¬H) 
 
and a similar result holds for P(H|E*). Using Bayes’s theorem, we can thus derive P(H|E) 
and P(H|E*) from equations (a) and (b) in lemma 1. The derivation of P(H|E*) (theorem 
2) is straightforward; the derivation of P(H|E) (theorem 3) is given formally in the 
appendix. 
 
Theorem 2. For each x∈{0, 1},  
 
                          n 
                            r ∑ (    ) ph(1-p)n-h 
 h>n/2    h 
P(H|E*) = P(X=x|Nx > n/2) = . 
                     n              n 
          r ∑ (   ) ph(1-p)n-h + (1-r)  ∑ (   ) (1-p)hpn-h 
           h>n/2   h           h>n/2   h 
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An implication worth noting is the following. In the special case where n is odd and r = 
½, we have 
 
                       n 
P(X=x|Nx > n/2) = ∑  (    ) ph(1-p)n-h,  
       h>n/2    h 
 
i.e.  P(X=x|Nx > n/2) = P(Nx > n/2|X=x),  
 
and thus P(H|E*) = P(E*|H). 
 
Theorem 3. Suppose h > n/2. For each x∈{0, 1},  
   
                               r pm               r 
 P(H|E) = P(X=x|Nx = h) =  = ,  
                    r pm + (1-r) (1-p)m      r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
 
where m = 2h-n. 
 
Note that E contains more information than E*; E implies E*, whereas the converse does 
not hold. To test hypothesis H it is desirable to use as much evidence as we have, and 
hence we will now be concerned with evidence of the kind E rather than the kind E*.  
 
By theorem 3, if p > ½, P(H|E) = P(X=x|Nx = h) is an increasing function of m. Here m is 
precisely the absolute margin between the majority of jurors who have voted for x (h) and 
the minority who have voted against x (k:=n-h). Therefore, for any fixed prior probability 
r that the hypothesis H is true, the posterior probability that H is true given the evidence 
E depends only on the absolute margin between the majority (for x) and the minority 
(against x) and is an increasing function of that margin. Particularly, P(X=x|Nx = h) is 
invariant under any changes of n and h that preserve m. Condorcet’s own formula is a 
special case of the formula in theorem 3 for r = ½.  
 
The posterior probability P(H|E) captures the degree of belief we assign to the hypothesis 
H after seeing the evidence E. Of course, P(H|E) depends on the prior probability r=P(H) 
we assign to the hypothesis before seeing the evidence. However, with regard to the 
evidence E itself, all that matters is the absolute margin between the majority of jurors 
voting for x and the minority voting against x (and the competence parameter p). This 
confirms Condorcet’s basic insight. 
 
4. The significance of the absolute margin for the degree of support the evidence 
gives to the hypothesis  
 
The main result of the previous section suggests that the absolute margin has a special 
significance for testing the hypothesis H on the basis of the evidence E. Is this result an 
artefact of our particular method of testing H by considering the degree of belief we 
assign to H given E? Or does a similar result hold if we use a different method of testing 
H on the basis of E? 
 
 8 
Recent work in Bayesian confirmation theory has advocated the use of the likelihood 
ratio9 as a measure of the degree of support some evidence E gives to some hypothesis H 
(Royall 1997, Fitelson 2001). The likelihood ratio is defined as  
  
          P(E|H) 
 l(H, E) :=  . 
        P(E|¬H) 
 
Unlike the probability P(H|E) discussed in section 3, the likelihood ratio does not depend 
on the prior probability we assign to the hypothesis H, nor does it refer to the degree of 
belief we attach to H given the evidence E. Nonetheless, the likelihood ratio has some 
implications for how the prior and posterior probabilities of H are related. It has the 
following property: 
 
   > 1  if P(H|E) > P(H) 
l(H, E) = { = 1 if P(H|E) = P(H) 
  < 1 if P(H|E) < P(H). 
 
In other words, the likelihood ratio is greater than 1 if observing the evidence E would 
increase our degree of belief in H, it equals 1 if observing E would leave our degree of 
belief in H unchanged, and it is less than 1 if observing E would decrease our degree of 
belief in H – regardless of what degree of belief we actually attach to H. Moreover, let 
R(H) := P(H)/P(¬H) be the ratio of our degree of belief in H to our degree of belief in the 
negation of H before observing E, and let R(H|E) := P(H|E)/P(¬H|E) be the 
corresponding ratio after observing E. Then the likelihood ratio satisfies  
 
 R(H) l(H, E) = R(H|E). 
 
In other words, the likelihood ratio can be interpreted as the factor by which observing 
the evidence E would change the ratio of our degree of belief in H to our degree of belief 
in the negation of H – regardless of what that ratio is. Further, by Bayes’s theorem, the 
likelihood also satisfies 
 
                   P(H)  
P(H|E) =  . 
       P(H) + P(¬H) 1/l(H, E) 
 
Fitelson (2001) has shown that the (logarithm of the) likelihood ratio has some other 
properties that make it particularly suitable as a measure of incremental support some 
evidence gives to some hypothesis.10 
 
So, in terms of the likelihood ratio, let us ask what degree of support the evidence E in 
our model (i.e. a majority of precisely h out of n jurors have voted for x) gives to the 
hypothesis H (i.e. the true state of the world is x). The following theorem is proved in the 
appendix: 
 
                                                          
9 Or the logarithm of the likelihood ratio. 
10 Specifically, Fitelson (2001) shows that the logarithm of the likelihood ratio satisfies the Peirceian 
additivity condition, the negation symmetry condition and the urn condition. 
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Theorem 4. Suppose h > n/2. Then  
   
                     p      m 
 l(H, E) = ()   ,     
                               1-p           
 
where m = 2h-n. 
 
Theorem 4 shows that, like the posterior probability P(H|E), the likelihood ratio l(H, E) is 
an increasing function of m, where m is the absolute margin between the majority of 
jurors who have voted for x (h) and the minority who have voted against x (k:=n-h).11 In 
particular, like P(H|E), l(H, E) is invariant under any changes of n and h that preserve m. 
So, if we determine the degree of support the evidence E gives to the hypothesis H, again 
all that matters is the absolute margin between the majority of jurors voting for x and the 
minority voting against x.12 This further supports the claim that in the classical Condorcet 
jury model the absolute margin between the majority and the minority has a special 
significance for testing the hypothesis H on the basis of the evidence E. In theorem 10 in 
the appendix, it is shown that a similar result holds for two other methods of measuring 
the degree of support E gives to H, namely for the so-called difference and ratio 
measures. 
 
5. An implication for the definition of special majority voting 
 
Let us fix x (where x=1 or x=0), and consider again the hypothesis H that X=x (e.g. the 
defendant is guilty; the patient has condition C). Suppose the aim is to make a positive 
decision (e.g. to convict the defendant, or to treat the patient) if and only if H is true. 
There are two possible types of error:  
 
• False positives: a positive decision is made even though H is false. 
• False negatives: a negative decision is made even though H is true. 
 
In many decision problems, there is an asymmetry between false positives and false 
negatives. Often one type of error is considered worse than the other. In a jury decision, 
false positives are usually considered worse than false negatives: it is considered worse to 
convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty. In a medical context, by contrast, false 
negatives are sometimes worse than false positives: it may be worse to fail to treat an ill 
person than to mistakenly treat a healthy one (provided that the treatment has no negative 
side-effects). 
 
We may therefore look for a decision procedure that respects that asymmetry, and that 
makes the “weightier” decision (that decision with respect to which an error is worse) 
only if the correctness of the decision is beyond any reasonable doubt. Many decision 
making bodies use the method of special (as opposed to simple) majority voting for this 
purpose.13 Special majority voting is usually defined in terms of the proportion of the jury 
                                                          
11 So long as p > ½. 
12 And the competence parameter p. 
13 Although there is a vast literature on the Condorcet jury theorem, not much of that literature addresses 
special majority voting. The technical results most closely related to the present ones are Nitzan and 
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– e.g. 2/3 or 5/6 – that is required for a positive decision, where that proportion is strictly 
greater than ½. The formal definition is the following: 
  
A proportion rule with parameter qmin. For any n, a positive decision is made if and 
only if the number of votes for a positive decision divided by the total number n exceeds 
(alternatively: is at least) qmin.  
 
The limiting case qmin = 1/2 is the case of simple majority rule. A proportion rule where 
the parameter qmin is strictly greater than ½ makes it harder to reach a positive decision 
(e.g. to convict) than a negative one (e.g. to acquit). In a minimal sense, the rule therefore 
appears to respect the asymmetry between the two possible types of error. But I will also 
consider an alternative definition of special majority voting. The alternative definition 
focuses not on the proportion of the majority in the jury, but rather on the absolute 
margin between the majority and the minority. 
 
An absolute margin rule with parameter mmin. For any n, a positive decision is made if 
and only if the difference between the number votes for a positive decision and the 
number votes against a positive decision exceeds (alternatively: is at least) mmin.  
 
The limiting case mmin = 0 is the case of simple majority rule. For any fixed number of 
jurors n, the two definitions of special majority voting can be made equivalent by setting 
qmin := 1/2(mmin/n + 1). What distinguishes the two definitions is that each definition holds 
its relevant parameter (qmin for the proportion rule and mmin for the absolute margin rule) 
fixed for all values of n. The  condition for a positive decision under the proportion rule is 
that a proportion exceeding (or at least) qmin (e.g. 2/3) of the jury supports a positive 
decision, regardless of whether this corresponds to 8 out of 12 jurors or to 667 out of 
1000. The condition for a positive decision under the absolute margin rule, by contrast, is 
that the difference between the number of votes for a positive decision and the number of 
votes for a negative decision is greater than (or at least) mmin (e.g. 12), regardless of 
whether this corresponds to 12 out of 12 jurors or to 506 out of 1000.  
 
Now the crucial question is this: Which of the two types of special majority rules is more 
suitable for respecting the asymmetry between false positives and false negatives, and for 
making decisions that track the truth in the limit? In subsection 5.1 we address the 
question about respecting the asymmetry, and in subsection 5.2 we address the one about 
truth-tracking in the limit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Paroush (1984) and Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997). Fey (2001) provides an extension of these results. All 
of these papers are concerned with determining the ‘optimal’ size of a special majority, given various 
specifications of a Condorcet jury framework. However, they do not explore the possibility of defining 
special majority voting in terms of a required absolute margin. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), 
Coughlan (2000), Gerardi (2000), and Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) all discuss the 
Condorcet jury theorem in relation to unanimous jury verdicts. Kanazawa (1998) provides a Condorcet jury 
theorem for special majority voting with high individual competence. 
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5.1 Making positive decisions if and only if the truth of the hypothesis is beyond any 
reasonable doubt 
 
As before, x is fixed (where x=1 or x=0), and H is the hypothesis that X=x. We also fix 
the parameters r and p. Suppose our goal is to avoid false decisions in favour of x as 
much as we can. Then we may want to find a decision procedure which satisfies the 
following condition. Let us choose a certain threshold c, where 0 < c < 1, typically close 
to 1, e.g. c = 0.95.   
 
No reasonable doubt (D). In any given situation (where precisely h jurors have voted for 
x and n-h jurors against x), a positive decision is made if and only if our degree of belief 
in H is greater than or equal to the threshold c. 
 
Suppose the threshold c is so close to 1 that we consider any proposition with a 
probability greater than or equal to c to be true beyond any reasonable doubt. Then 
condition (D) can be interpreted as the requirement that a positive decision should be 
made if and only if we believe H to be true beyond any reasonable doubt. Is it possible to 
specify a single fixed parameter qmin (for a proportion rule) or a single fixed parameter 
mmin (for an absolute margin rule) such that condition (D) is satisfied for any number of 
jurors n? 
 
Suppose we have observed the evidence E that precisely h out of n jurors have voted for 
x. Condition (D) requires us to make a positive decision if and only if P(H|E) equals or 
exceeds c. When does P(H|E) (i.e. P(X=x|Nx=h)) equal or exceed c? The following 
theorem answers that question.  
 
Theorem 5.14 Let c be a fixed threshold such that 0 < c < 1. For each x∈{0, 1}, 
 
(i)  P(X=x|Nx=h) ≥ (>) c  
 
if and only if 
 
            r-cr 
              log() 
            c-cr  
(ii) m ≥ (>)   (=: mmin), 
               log(1/p - 1) 
 
where m = 2h-n. 
 
A proof is given in the appendix. By theorem 5, to implement condition (D), we have to 
make a positive decision if and only if the absolute margin between the number of jurors 
                                                          
14 For a related result, see the ‘convincing majorities theorem’ in Hawthorne (2001). Hawthorne also shows 
that the proportion of the electorate required to obtain a ‘convincing majority’ converges to ½ as the 
number of individuals increases and proves a Condorcet jury theorem on the likelihood of obtaining a 
‘convincing majority’. At the cost of more complicated mathematics, Hawthorne’s framework, unlike the 
classical Condorcet jury framework, allows different competence levels for different individuals and 
dependencies between the choices of different individuals. In another related paper, Goodin (2002) 
addresses the question of when a majority can convince an agent of the negation of a proposition, where the 
agent initially assigns a high prior probability to the truth of that proposition. 
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who have voted for x and the number of jurors who have voted against x is greater than or 
equal to the fixed parameter mmin. The parameter mmin is a function of c, r and p. In 
particular, mmin is invariant under changes of n, the size of the jury. Thus we can 
implement condition (D) by using an absolute margin rule with parameter mmin. Table 1 
reports some sample calculations of the required values of mmin, for different values of p, 
r and c.  
 
Table 1. Values of mmin corresponding to different values of p, r and c (rounded up to 
the nearest integer) 
 r = 0.001 r = 0.01 r = 0.25 r = 0.4 r = 0.5 r = 0.6 r = 0.75 
p = 0.51  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
173 
201 
288 
346 
115 
143 
230 
288 
28 
55 
143 
201 
11 
38 
125 
183 
0 
28 
115 
173 
0 
18 
105 
163 
0 
0 
88 
146 
p = 0.55  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
35 
40 
58 
69 
23 
29 
46 
58 
6 
11 
29 
40 
3 
8 
25 
37 
0 
6 
23 
35 
0 
4 
21 
33 
0 
0 
18 
29 
p = 0.6    c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
18 
20 
29 
35 
12 
15 
23 
29 
3 
6 
15 
20 
1 
4 
13 
19 
0 
3 
12 
18 
0 
2 
11 
17 
0 
0 
9 
15 
p = 0.75  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
7 
8 
11 
13 
5 
6 
9 
11 
1 
2 
6 
8 
1 
2 
5 
7 
0 
1 
5 
7 
0 
1 
4 
6 
0 
0 
4 
6 
p = 0.9    c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
4 
4 
6 
7 
3 
3 
5 
6 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
1 
3 
4 
0 
1 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
0 
2 
3 
 
From table 1, we can infer the value of mmin that we need to choose in an absolute margin 
rule in order to implement condition (D), given the values of  p, r and c. For example, 
suppose juror competence is p = 0.6, our prior probability that the defendant is guilty is r 
= 0.001, and we require a degree-of-belief threshold of c = 0.99 for conviction. Then a 
margin of at least 29 is required for conviction.15 
 
Can we implement condition (D) in terms of a proportion rule as well? In answer to this 
question, first note that, once we fix the values of p, r and c, a certain minimal jury size is 
required to enable a positive decision in accordance with condition (D). In the present 
example (p = 0.6, r = 0.001 and c = 0.99), if the total number of jurors is n = 29, 
unanimous support is required to secure the required margin of 29. If the total number of 
jurors is less than 29, a positive decision is never possible for the given values of p, r and 
c. If the total number of jurors is n = 600, on the other hand, 315 out of 600 votes are 
sufficient to secure the required margin of 29 between the majority and the minority. This 
corresponds to a 52.5% majority.  
 
                                                          
15 Whenever mmin = 0 in table 1, this means that, given the competence parameter p and the prior 
probability r, any majority from 50% onwards (including a tie) will already be sufficient to ensure that the 
posterior probability of the correctness of a positive decision equals or exceeds c. 
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More generally, as noted above, given a jury of size n, a margin mmin between the 
majority and the minority is equivalent to a proportion qmin = 1/2(mmin/n + 1) of the jury. 
However, for any fixed values of p, r and c, the value of qmin (unlike the value of mmin) 
depends on n and tends to 1/2 as the number of individuals n tends to infinity. To 
illustrate, if n is greater than 17300, the value of qmin will be less than 51% for all values 
of mmin shown in table 1. The next theorem follows immediately: 
 
Theorem 6.16 Let c be a fixed threshold such that 0 < c < 1. For each x∈{0, 1}, 
 
(i)  P(X=x|Nx=h) ≥ (>) c  
 
if and only if 
 
                   r-cr 
                     log() 
                   c-cr  
(ii) q ≥ (>) 1/2 (  + 1)  (:= qmin), 
                     n log(1/p - 1) 
 
where q = h/n. 
 
Table 2 reports some sample calculations of qmin, for different values of p, n and c, but 
with a fixed r = 0.001. 
 
Table 2. Values of qmin corresponding to different values of p, n and c, with r = 0.001 
(rounded up to the nearest number with one decimal place) 
 n = 12 n = 50 n = 100  n = 300 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 10000 
p = 0.51  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
78.9% 
83.5% 
98% 
n/a 
67.3% 
70.1% 
78.8% 
84.6% 
58.7% 
60.1% 
64.4% 
67.3% 
50.9% 
51.1% 
51.5% 
51.8% 
p = 0.55  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
85% 
90% 
n/a 
n/a 
67.5% 
70% 
79% 
84.5% 
55.9% 
56.7% 
59.7% 
61.5% 
53.5% 
54% 
55.8% 
56.9% 
51.75% 
52% 
52.9% 
53.5% 
50.2% 
50.2% 
50.3% 
50.4% 
p = 0.6    c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
68% 
70% 
79% 
85% 
59% 
60% 
64.5% 
67.5% 
53% 
53.4% 
54.9% 
55.9% 
51.8% 
52% 
52.9% 
53.5% 
50.9% 
51% 
51.5% 
51.8% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
50.2% 
50.2% 
p = 0.75  c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
79.2% 
83.4% 
95.9% 
n/a 
57% 
58% 
61% 
63% 
53.5% 
54% 
55.5% 
56.5% 
51.2% 
51.4% 
51.9% 
52.2% 
50.7% 
50.8% 
51.1% 
51.3% 
50.4% 
50.4% 
50.6% 
50.7% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
p = 0.9    c = 0.5 
               c = 0.75 
               c = 0.99 
               c = 0.999 
66.7% 
66.7% 
75% 
79.2% 
54% 
54% 
56% 
57% 
52% 
52% 
53% 
53.5% 
50.7% 
50.7% 
51% 
51.2% 
50.4% 
50.4% 
50.6% 
50.7% 
50.2% 
50.2% 
50.3% 
50.4% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
50.1% 
 
                                                          
16 Theorem 6 can be interpreted as a slightly more general variant of a theorem by Nitzan and Paroush 
(1984). Nitzan and Paroush's result concerns the special case c = 1/2. Their result, however, focuses entirely 
on the definition of special majority voting in terms of proportions rather than absolute margins.  
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Theorem 6 implies that, even when we fix p, r and c, there exists no single fixed 
parameter qmin for a proportion rule such that condition (D) is satisfied for all numbers of 
jurors n. The value of qmin required to implement condition (D) depends on the size of the 
jury and converges to 1/2 as that size tends to infinity. In a sufficiently large jury, qmin thus 
approximates 1/2. From the perspective of condition (D), the epistemic justifiability of a 
proportion rule, particularly with a parameter qmin significantly greater than 1/2, is 
therefore questionable.  
 
5.2 Tracking the truth in the limit 
 
We now turn to the perspective of the Condorcet jury theorem again. For both the 
proportion rule and the absolute margin rule, we will consider the probability that x is 
chosen, given that the state of the world is x. This is the probability that we described as 
being relevant for assessing the epistemic properties of a decision procedure from a 
‘global’ perspective. We will see that the use of a proportion rule (as opposed to an 
absolute margin rule) may be even counterproductive from that perspective: While an 
absolute margin rule always tracks the truth in the limit (i.e. it satisfies condition (T))17, a 
proportion rule may fail to track the truth even in the limit (i.e. it may violate condition 
(T)). 
 
We consider the probability P(Nx/n≥ qmin|X=x) that x will be supported by a proportion of 
at least qmin of a jury of size n, given that x is the true state of the world. 
 
Theorem 7.18  
(a) If 1/2 < p < qmin, then P(Nx/n≥ qmin|X=x) converges to 0 as n tends to infinity. 
(b) If p > qmin, then P(Nx/n≥ qmin|X=x) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
A proof is given in the appendix. Let us call a decision in favour of x=1 a positive 
decision. If we use a proportion rule with parameter qmin, theorem 7 immediately implies 
the following: 
 
If 1/2 < p < qmin, then 
• P(1 is chosen|X=1) converges to 0 as n tends to infinity, and 
• P(0 is chosen|X=0) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
If p > qmin, then 
• P(1 is chosen|X=1) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity, and 
• P(0 is chosen|X=0) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
Therefore a proportion rule with parameter qmin > ½ satisfies condition (T) if and only if 
p>qmin. This implies that, if 1/2 < p < qmin, the rule violates condition (T). 
 
By contrast, we will now see that an absolute margin with any parameter mmin satisfies 
condition (T). We consider the probability P(Nx-N1-x≥mmin|X=x) that x will be supported 
                                                          
17 So long as p>½. 
18 For result related to the second part of this proposition, see Kanazawa (1998). 
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by a majority with a margin of at least mmin between the majority and the minority, given 
that x is the true state of the world. 
 
Theorem 8. For any mmin > 0, if p > 1/2, then P(Nx-N1-x≥mmin|X=x) converges to 1 as n 
tends to infinity. 
 
A proof is also given in the appendix. Suppose we use an absolute margin rule with 
parameter mmin. Then theorem 8 immediately implies the following: 
 
For any p > ½ and any mmin > 0, 
• P(1 is chosen|X=1) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity, and 
• P(0 is chosen|X=0) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
Therefore an absolute margin rule satisfies condition (T) for all p > ½ and for any value 
of mmin. The results of this section show that absolute margin rules track the truth in the 
limit as soon as each individual is better than random at tracking the truth, whereas 
proportion rules may fail to track the truth unless individual competence is very high (i.e. 
p > qmin) or the required proportion equals only ½. 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
Absolute margin rules are more ‘epistemically sound’ than proportion rules in the 
following sense: 
 
• When we fix p, r and c, there exists a single fixed parameter mmin such that a 
corresponding absolute margin rule satisfies condition (D) for all values of n. 
• An absolute margin rule satisfies condition (T) for any p > ½ and any mmin > 0. 
 
By contrast: 
• Even when we fix p, r and c, there exists no single fixed parameter qmin such that a 
corresponding proportion rule satisfies condition (D) for all values of n. Rather, to 
implement condition (D), the definition of a proportion rule would have to be 
modified to allow the use of different values of qmin for different values of n. 
• A proportion rule violates condition (T) if 1/2 < p < qmin, and satisfies condition (T) if 
and only if p > qmin. 
 
From the perspective of the classical Condorcet jury model, we should therefore advocate 
the definition of special majority voting in terms of the required absolute margin rather 
than the required proportion. If we want to resist this conclusion, we have two 
alternatives. Either we defend the use of a proportion rule for reasons other than 
‘epistemic’ ones, or we reject the classical Condorcet jury model and find an alternative 
model that avoids the present results on the significance of the absolute margin. 
 
A ‘non-epistemic’ defence of a decision procedure would be one that appeals not to the 
claim that the procedure tracks the truth, but rather to the claim that the procedure has 
certain procedural properties. There may be different views on what those procedural 
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properties are. The relevant properties in the case of proportion rules might be giving 
veto power (and thus special protection) to minorities, or securing the legitimacy of a 
decision by ensuring the endorsement of that decision by a large proportion of the jury or 
electorate. In some contexts, especially ones where it unclear whether there exists a 
relevant state of the world that the decision is supposed to track, those considerations 
might provide perfectly good reasons for the use of proportion rules rather than absolute 
margin rules. 
 
But even from an epistemic perspective, it might still be possible to resist the conclusions 
of the present section: we would simply need to find a plausible alternative to the 
classical Condorcet jury model in which Condorcet’s insight about the significance of the 
absolute margin does not hold. 
 
6. The jury model without the assumption of symmetrical competence 
 
In the classical Condorcet jury model, it is assumed that each juror’s probability of voting 
for x, given that the state of the world is x, is the same for x = 1 and x = 0. This 
assumption of symmetrical competence is rather demanding. It is plausible to assume that 
in many contexts a juror’s probability of making a correct decision may depend on what 
the state of the world is. In the jury example, detecting innocence given that the 
defendant is truly innocent might be easier than detecting guilt given that the defendant is 
truly guilty. In the medical example, it might sometimes be easier to diagnose a certain 
medical condition than to rule it out. Or it might even be desirable to design a diagnostic 
test for which the probability of a positive verdict, given that the patient has condition C, 
is greater than the probability of a negative verdict, given that the patient does not have 
condition C. Many diagnostic tests have this property. 
 
It is therefore interesting to ask whether the present results on the significance of the 
absolute margin are robust to a relaxation of the assumption of symmetrical competence. 
As defined above, let p1:=P(Vi=1|X=1)>½ and p0:=P(Vi=0|X=0)>½. We keep the 
assumptions of competence and independence, but not the assumption of symmetrical 
competence. Theorem 1 does not require the assumption of symmetrical competence and 
therefore continues to hold. Theorems 3 and 4, however, no longer hold. Instead, we 
have: 
 
Theorem 9. Suppose h > n/2. Let H be the hypothesis that X=1, and E the evidence that 
N1 = h. Then  
   
                         r p1m            r  
(a) P(H|E) = P(X=1|N1 = h) =   =  ;  
          r p1m + (1-r) (1-p0)m αk        r + (1-r) (1-p0/p1)m αk  
    
     p1h(1-p1)n-h          p1        m 
(b) l(H, E) =  = () (1/α)k,     
     (1-p0)hp0n-h        1-p0                                (1-p0)p0 
where m = 2h-n, k = n-h, and α =  .                    (1-p1)p1 
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The proof of theorem 9 is given in the appendix. Parts (a) and (b) of theorem 9 
correspond to theorems 3 and 4, and are equivalent to these theorems for the special cases 
p0 = p1 or k = 0. The smaller the difference between p0 and p1, the more closely will the 
equations in theorems 3 and 4 approximate equations (a) and (b) in theorem 9, 
particularly for small values of k.  
 
Assuming that p0, p1 > ½, note that p0 < p1 implies α > 1, p0 = p1 implies α = 1, and  
p0 > p1 implies α < 1.19 This means that, when p0 ≠ p1, P(H|E) and l(H, E) depend not 
only on m (in addition to the standard parameters), but also on k (and thereby on n and h), 
where k is the number of jurors in the minority. In particular, suppose we hold the 
standard parameters (r, p1, p0) and the absolute margin m fixed. Then we have: 
 
• If p0 > p1, P(H|E) and l(H, E) are strictly increasing functions of k (and thereby of n); 
P(H|E) converges to 1 and l(H, E) tends to infinity as n (and thereby k) tends to 
infinity. Both functions assume their minimum in the case of unanimity (i.e. when 
h=m and k=0) and increase as the proportion h/n converges to ½.  
• If p1 > p0, P(H|E) and l(H, E) are strictly decreasing functions of k (and thereby of n); 
they both converge to 0 as n (and thereby k) tends to infinity. Both functions assume 
their maximum in the case of unanimity (i.e. when h=m and k=0) and decrease as the 
proportion h/n converges to ½.20 
 
This shows that, if competence is asymmetrical, the absolute margin is no longer 
significant by itself. In two different situations with the same absolute margin h-k but 
with a different proportion h/n, the values of P(H|E) and l(H, E) can be very different. Let 
m be any absolute margin, no matter how large or small. If p0 > p1, the value of P(H|E) is 
smaller if the margin m is achieved by unanimity than if the same margin m is achieved 
by a proportion close to ½. This means that in the present case, all other things being 
equal (particularly m), a larger proportion is worse than a smaller proportion. If p1 > p0, 
by contrast, the value of P(H|E) is larger if the margin m is achieved by unanimity than if 
the same margin m is achieved by a proportion close to ½. Here, all other things being 
equal, a larger proportion is better than a smaller proportion. 
 
In the case of asymmetrical competence, both the absolute margin and the proportion 
required for implementing condition (D) depend on n. Hence there exists neither a single 
fixed parameter mmin nor a single fixed parameter qmin such that a corresponding absolute 
margin or proportion rule satisfies condition (D) for all numbers of jurors n. Irrespective 
of whether we prefer to define a voting rule in terms of a required proportion or in terms 
of a required absolute margin, the parameter of that rule will be a function of n. 
 
                                                          
19 This can be shown by setting p0 = ½ + ε0 and p1 = ½ + ε1. Then ((1-p0)p0)/((1-p1)p1) = ((½-ε0)(½+ε0))/((½-ε1)(½+ε1))=(1/4-ε02)/(1/4-ε12). If ε0<ε1, then (1/4-ε02)>(1/4-ε12); if ε0=ε1, then (1/4-ε02)=(1/4-ε12); if ε0>ε1, then (1/4-ε02)<(1/4-ε12). 
20 Crucially, where m is held fixed. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Condorcet’s insight on the significance of the absolute margin is no less striking today 
than it must have been when it was first discovered by Condorcet. Within the classical 
Condorcet jury model, the insight is valid irrespective of whether we are concerned with 
the degree of belief we assign to the truth of the hypothesis given the jurors’ verdicts, or 
with the degree of support the jurors’ verdicts give to the truth of the hypothesis. An 
important implication is that, if we accept the classical Condorcet jury model and we 
want to make decisions by special majority voting, then absolute margin rules are the 
appropriate types of special majority rules, while proportion rules are questionable from 
an epistemic perspective. However, all these results depend crucially on the assumption 
of symmetrical competence. The absolute margin between the majority and the minority 
is the uniquely significant epistemic criterion if and only if juror competence is 
symmetrical. 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of theorem 3. Suppose h > n/2. By Bayes’s law,  
 
         P(X=x) P(Nx=h|X=x) 
P(X=x|Nx = h)  =  
 P(Nx=h) 
 
            P(X=x) P(Nx=h|X=x) 
   =  . 
       P(X=x) P(Nx=h|X=x) + P(X≠x) P(Nx=h|X≠x) 
 
By equation (a) in lemma 1,  
 
           n 
P(X=x) P(Nx=h|X=x) = r (  ) ph(1-p)n-h. 
            h 
 
By the symmetry assumption, 
 
                 n 
P(X≠x) P(Nx=h|X≠x) = (1-r) (  ) (1-p)hpn-h. 
                  h 
 
So  
 
                       n 
             r (  ) ph(1-p)n-h 
                       h 
P(X=x|Nx = h)  =  
             n            n 
                             r (  ) ph(1-p)n-h + (1-r) (  ) (1-p)hpn-h 
             h            h 
 
    r p2h-n 
   =   
       r p2h-n + (1-r) (1-p)2h-n 
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   r pm        r 
=  =  , 
     r pm + (1-r) (1-p)m     r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
 
where m = 2h-n. ? 
 
Proof of theorem 4. Suppose h > n/2.  
      
      P(E|H) 
l(H, E) =   . 
       P(E|¬H) 
  
By equation (a) in lemma 1, 
 
             n 
P(E|H) = (    ) ph(1-p)n-h. 
         h 
 
By the symmetry assumption, 
 
                n 
P(E|¬H) = (   ) (1-p)hpn-h. 
            h 
 
Hence 
 
         n 
      (   ) ph(1-p)n-h 
           h 
l(H, E) =    
           n    (  ) (1-p)hpn-h 
           h 
 
         p      2h-m 
= ()         
                   1-p           
 
         p      m 
= ()   ,     
                   1-p           
 
where m = 2h-n. ? 
 
Proof of theorem 5. By theorem 3, we know that 
   r 
  P(X=x|Nx=h) =  , 
 r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
 
where m = 2h-n. Hence we have  
 
P(X=x|Nx=h) ≥ (>) c  
   r 
if and only if   ≥ (>) c 
r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
 
   r-cr 
if and only if  ≥ (>) (1/p - 1)m 
   c-cr  
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                         r-cr 
                log() 
                        c-cr  
if and only if m ≥ (>)  , 
                 log(1/p - 1) 
 
as required. ? 
 
Definition. A condition φ on the probability p is consistent if there exists a value of p 
satisfying φ. A condition φ on p is strict if, for every value of p satisfying φ, there exists 
an ε > 0 such that, whenever |p*-p|<ε, then p* also satisfies φ.  
 
An example of a consistent strict condition on p is p > 1/2. The condition p = 1/2 is 
consistent, but not strict. The condition p < 0 is not consistent. 
 
Lemma (Convergence Lemma). Suppose p satisfies the consistent strict condition 
φ. Then P(Nx/n satisfies φ | X=x) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
 
The lemma can be derived from the weak law of large numbers. 
 
Proof of theorem 7. Let qmin > 1/2. 
• Suppose p satisfies 1/2 < p < qmin.  As this condition is consistent and strict, the 
convergence lemma above implies that P(1/2 < Nx/n < qmin|X=x) converges to 1 as n 
tends to infinity. The result follows. 
• Suppose p satisfies p > qmin. As this condition is consistent and strict, the convergence 
lemma above implies that P(Nx/n > qmin|X=x) converges to 1 as n increases. The result 
follows. ? 
 
Proof of theorem 8. Suppose that p > 1/2. Let mmin > 0. Then 2p > 1, and 2p-1 > 0. In 
particular, there exists ε > 0 such that 2p-1 > ε. As this condition is consistent and strict, 
the convergence lemma above implies that P(2Nx-n>nε|X=x)=P(2Nx/n-1>ε|X=x) 
converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. But, when n > mmin/ε, we have nε > mmin. Then 
P(2Nx-n>mmin|X=x) converges to 1 as n tends to infinity. But 2Nx-n = Nx-N1-x is precisely 
the margin between the majority and the minority. The result follows. ? 
 
Proof of theorem 9. Let H be the hypothesis that X=1, and E the evidence that N1 = h. 
We first prove part (b). By the definition of l(H, E) and the binomial distributions of N1 
and N0, we have 
 
               n    (    ) p1h(1-p1)n-h 
            h       p1h(1-p1)n-h              p1        
m 
 l(H, E) =  =  = () (1/α)k, 
               n      (1-p0)hp0n-h         1-p0    (    ) (1-p0)hp0n-h 
            h                     (1-p0)p0 
where m = 2h-n, k = n-h, and α =  .                    (1-p1)p1 
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Now part (a) can be derived straightforwardly from  
 
                   P(H)  
P(H|E) =  . ? 
       P(H) + P(¬H) 1/l(H, E) 
 
Definition. The difference measure is defined as 
 
d(H, E) := P(H|E)-P(H), 
 
and the ratio measure is defined as 
  
        P(H|E) 
 r(H, E) :=  . 
         P(H) 
 
For a detailed discussion of these measures, see Fitelson (2001).21 
 
Theorem 10. Suppose h > n/2. Then  
 
     r  
 d(H, E) =  - r, 
      r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
 
    1 
and r(H, E) =  , 
      r + (1-r) (1/p - 1)m 
   
where m = 2h-n. 
 
Proof of theorem 10. The theorem follows immediately from theorem 3 and the 
definitions of d and r.? 
 
The theorem implies that d(H, E) and r(H, E) both depend only on the parameters p, r and 
m and are increasing functions of each of these.22 
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